In a Naqshbandi Circle
RAOUL SIMAC
(1967)
IT HAS TRULY been said that ancient traditional teachings which
we—for want of a better term—call religious, especially in the
East, can be projected in forms which many people would not
recognize as 'religious' in our present-day sense at all.
Psychology, self-development, social adjustments, the cultivation
of certain arts and modes of thinking: these all form parts
of the Order of the Naqshbandi, whose members are found
throughout the Arabic, Persian, Turkish, Indian and Malayan
worlds. The Order was founded in the fourteenth century in
Bukhara, and its chief centres have generally been in Central Asia
since that time.
While the Sufis, or Dervishes, are generally regarded as
religious enthusiasts on the pattern of Western monastic communities, or else as individual poets or wanderers, this seems to
be because only certain forms of their activities have become
generally known.
I recently spent three months with a Naqshbandi circle in
Pakistan, whose members refused to have any ideological contact
with the overtly religious clerics, and entry to whose private
deliberations and exercises was difficult.
An important part of the studies was the consideration of the
Mullah-Nasreddin corpus of literature, generally regarded by
people in Pakistan as a series of jokes.
The use to which the tales of Nasreddin are put in Sufi circles,
however, shows that the intention of the teachers is to develop
in students a form of thinking which is different from customary
patterns. The emphasis upon faith, discipline and ritual, generally
regarded as essential in religious formulation in the world of
Islam, 'is the concern of other specialists'. I was most impressed
by these techniques. Whether or not they have any spiritual
validity as a part of a way to universal truth, the application of
this study-system has undeniable effects upon those taking part.
They seem to suffer from little sectarian bias, and in fact insist
that different religions are external shapes within which, from
time to time, eternal truths have been preached and 'made to
work within man'.
This outline is intended to describe some of the stories used
in this system, and the interpretation put upon them by the
teachers.
The first story is when Nasreddin falls from his roof on to a
man in the street. The man's neck is broken, but the Mullah is
not hurt. The teaching is: 'This goes against expected cause
and effect. Similarly, there is a system of understanding in the
world which you can attach yourself to when you can realize
that cause and effect need not enter into it.'
In the second story of the series, Nasreddin is made to say:
'I never tell the truth'. The explanations include: 'If this is true,
he is lying, if it is untrue, he does tell the truth. Note that by
wordplay we can arrive at anything, but this can never be truth'.
In the third story, the Mullah illustrates that man tries to
improve on his knowledge, his techniques, his capacities in life,
but he may lack other basic knowledge without which he is in
fact doing harm. Nasreddin finds a hawk with a curved beak and
talons. He has only seen pigeons before, so he thinks that this
bird is deformed. He cuts its claws and beak until they are
straight. 'This', goes the moral, 'is what you try to do with
metaphysical teaching. You try to fit it into preconceptions. If
you realize this, you will truly start to learn'.
Certain levels of human understanding cannot be attained, it
is claimed, until the brain can work in more than one way. This
is the equivalent of the result of what is in some systems a
'mystical illumination' process; but the Naqshbandis appear to
hold that the brain is prepared by degrees without this illumination
being as violent an experience as in other methods.
The problem of time and of justice and injustice is illustrated
by the contention that, whereas ordinary man believes that
reward and punishment follow actions, these Sufis hold that
there is a different time-system at work concurrently. In other
words, something that seems to follow something else may in
fact precede it in another time-system which is in fact with us.
This principle is illustrated by the tale of the bath-house.
Mullah Nasreddin visits a bath-house, where the man in charge treats him badly, getting a gold piece for his pains. On the next visit, the man waits on the Mullah hand and foot; but he only gets a copper coin. 'This coin', says the Mullah, 'is for the treatment which you gave me the first time. You have already had the gold coin which was payment for the second visit'.
These dervishes believe very strongly in this dogma: a man
may be given great advantages, for instance, which he must
regard as 'payment for something which he has to do'. The
converse may also be true.
If the Naqshbandis seem to be projecting an image of a series
of experiences of an invisible world parallel to ours, they also
stress strongly the need to be aware of the real events in this
time-system. In the story of the cloak, Nasreddin is admitted to
a certain feast because the doorkeepers are impressed by the regal
garb which he has assumed for the purpose. He comments upon
this by feeding some of the food to his cloak: 'You got me in,
here is your share', he says to it. The teaching underlying this
is given thus: 'Make sure that you realize the true cause and
effect situation when you are in one. Do not mistake one thing
for another.'
Self-deception and unfounded assumptions are held by this
circle to prevent the attainment of higher knowledge. There is
a tale which is used to illustrate this. Nasreddin says: 'The king
addressed me'. Everyone is impressed, because they assume that
something important must have been said. In fact, however, the
king had only said: 'Get out of my way!' In this story the
assumption is laid bare. So is the self-deception, because the
listener deceives himself into thinking that something important
must have happened. In real life, man does not carry his thinking
through to a point where he will see that he deceives himself:
in this case by feeling interested that he knows someone who
has been spoken to by a king.
Things are actually happening in the world, and especially
among the human race, which cannot be explained and which
have to be experienced—so runs the Naqshbandi creed. One
day, Mullah Nasreddin saw some people approaching. Fearing
that they might be robbers, he ran away and lay down in an open
grave nearby. The travellers, their curiousity aroused by this
strange behaviour, crowded around him and asked him why he
was there. His answer illustrates the impossibility of answering
some questions: 'You are here because of me, and I am here
because of you."
But the Naqshbandis teach in many different ways, in addition
to this Nasreddin-joke system. Whom they teach, and by what
method, will depend upon factors which they say have to be
decided by the teacher. For this reason they are often accused
of not sticking to one formula: they have no dogmas, 'only
objectives', as one teacher put it.
When I enquired into this aspect of the teaching, which was
quite new to me, I was told this joke as an answer: Nasreddin
went into a shop. He said to the shopkeeper: 'Have you flour?'
'Yes'. 'And milk, and sugar, and honey?' 'Yes'. Then, for
Heaven's sake, why don't you make sweetmeats?'
The moral, of course, was that a man may have certain things
and may need certain other things. But what each man has and
what he needs will vary, according to his individuality and other
factors.